The Influence of Settlers' Community in Shaping the Colonial Agricultural Marketing Policies in Tanzania



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THE INFLUENCE OF SETTLERS' COMMUNITY IN SHAPING THE COLONIAL AGRICULTURAL MARKETING POLICIES IN TANZANIA

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ABSTRACT: When the British colonial government took over Tanzania, colonial officials championed and encouraged the inhabitants in Kilimanjaro to grow coffee along with settlers. The authorities gave priority to the local smallholders, relegating settlers to a minor role within colonial agriculture and the coffee economy in particular. This generated a vigorous protest among the settlers against the government policy. The tension would bring a number of remarkable developments, including the establishment of the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA) and, later, the promulgation of legislation regulating coffee farming and marketing via cooperatives, such as the Co-operative Societies Ordinance No. 7 of 1932 and the Native Coffee Control Ordinance No 26 of 1937. This paper examines the interlocked dimensions and intricacies related to the coffee industry policies, and their impact on agricultural policies in Kilimanjaro region as well as across the country. In particular, the paper discusses how the

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settlers' opposition influenced the promulgation of segregative, monopolistic and protectionist legislations, and the role of control Boards in this process. To do so, this paper relies on existing literature as well as underutilized primary sources obtained from the Tanzania National Archives (TNA) in Dar Es Salaam.

KEYWORDS: agriculture, coffee, small-scale growers, policies, Kilimanjaro, settlers

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Introduction

When the British took over Tanzania after defeating Germany in the First World War, colonial authorities had to face the issue of how to reorganize the economy after the expulsion of German settlers from the territory.[1] The immediate plan was to place disposable plantations under colonial authority and, in line with previous German policies, the British accommodated a parallel coffee farming system in Kilimanjaro, forcing European settlers and local small-scale growers into competition over the production and sale of coffee. Indians and Greeks were the first to take the risk of filling the gap left by the Germans, engaging not only in coffee but also in sisal farming. However, attracting new investors in the agricultural sector proved to be a real challenge, since land policies did not take into account the purchase of land or land alienation, as reported by Buell.[2]

The influx was later joined by settlers from Kenya and Italy who, together with returnee Germans, established themselves not only in Kilimanjaro but also elsewhere in Tanzania between 1925 and 1927.[3] Like the others, most of the German returnees were given rights to settle in the southern highlands, in particular in Dabaga, Mufindi, Tukuyu, Lupembe, Mbeya, and Mbozi, where they engaged in livestock keeping as well as in coffee, tea, and tobacco farming.[4] Those from Kenya settled mostly in Kilimanjaro, where a considerable number of Greek, British Indians, Dutch, and a few English coffee planters were also found.[5] We know specifically about the cases of de Croce and Forster, respectively an Italian and British settler who had coffee plantations around Marangu village, on the foot slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro.[6]

Historical accounts show that across the country settlers relied on local laborers (for example, the WaChagga ethnic group worked in settlers and missionary coffee plantations). Through working in settlers' farms, many Chagga people learned coffee-farming husbandry: this proved essential in influencing them to start growing coffee on their own farms.[7]

Besides settlers, missionaries and government officials were key players in the promotion of coffee cultivation among the inhabitants in Kilimanjaro, both during German colonial rule and after the British took over Tanzania in 1919.[8] The efforts put in place by the colonial government to engage local inhabitants in the production of high quality coffee were a success, to the point that the cash crop became an integral part in the livelihoods of growers, who became dependent upon it for their income.[9]

However, such initiative of the colonial government generated the vigorous protest of the settlers on the slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro and the Pare Mountains, as well as in Rungwe and Meru (Arusha) districts. They argued that the small-scale coffee growers were inexperienced in farming and could thus jeopardize the overall quality of the product. In their view, allowing small-scale farmers to grow the crop could infect European estates with diseases and pests, hence leading to the loss of the invested capital.[10] They consistently asked the colonial authority to enforce a demarcated area (neutral zone) between European and African coffee farms to prevent not only the spread of diseases but also the theft of their crops. Moreover, the settlers urged the colonial authority to adopt the policy already implemented in Kenya that would prohibit Tanganyikans to grow coffee.[11]

At this stage, the settlers' protests took a clear political dimension. They indicated that their interests would be better served if they belonged to the colony of Kenya.[12] In a meeting held in Moshi in 1923, they subsequently passed a resolution asking the colonial authority to consider transferring Kilimanjaro region from Tanganyika to neighboring Kenya, where settlers' interests dominated policy and decision-making.[13] Lord Delamere, one of the wealthiest and most influential British settlers in Kenya in the first decades of the twentieth century, was reported among the supporters of this plan.[14] The settlers formed a special committee, known as the Kilimanjaro Planters' Association, which actively sought support from the Kenya Coffee Planters' Union in this endeavor. In their effort to describe the matter to their Kenyan colleagues, the Tanzanian settlers contended that due to the colonial government, at least in the Moshi district, their industry was relegated to a secondary position in favor of Tanganyikans and African growers.[15] The council of the Kenya Coffee Planters' Union passed a resolution embracing the views of the Tanganyika Association, declaring that Kenya's coffee industry was also exposed to the same threat due to the policy of the government. The settlers' standpoint even enjoyed the short-lived support of Sir Horace Byatt, the Governor of Tanzania between 1919 and 1924.[16] Byatt reiterated that coffee, with the exception of Robusta variety, was essentially a European-grown crop.[17] He would eventually change his mind, and both himself and Major Charles Dundas—who was by then the Moshi's District Commissioner (DC)—found that the grievances were baseless as production surpassed the settlers' combined tonnage.[18] It was also argued that:

> Suppression of coffee planting was out of the question. The British government could not suppress development initiated by the Germans and no rules for suppression of the Native enterprise would ever have been permitted by the government or countenance by the League of Nation (UNO). Moreover, no government could set out to root up trees, which had stood for 15 years and were bringing in secure and ample income. It is clear therefore that before the British government entered in the administration of Tanganyika certain of the WaChagga had already seen and experience of benefits to be derived from the cultivation of coffee.[19]

As a matter of fact, Horace Byatt went as far as claiming that Africans should have been further encouraged as they had proved pivotal in the realization of the self-sufficiency policy.[20] Moreover, it was a responsibility of the colonial authority in Tanzania to comply with the League of Nations and it is clear that no more land on that mountain could be alienated to non-African enterprises.[21] In a similar fashion, the East Africa Commission added that:

> Native production should be encouraged, trained, and supervised. Without it, vast areas of land in native occupation cannot be developed as they should be, and by training the native to become a better and more progressive agriculturist on his own land, we shall be adopting one of the best means to his economic, moral, and social advancement.[22]

Consequently, the government not only preserved the cultivation privileges of the WaChagga growers in Kilimanjaro, but it also expanded its support. The colonial authority commitment attracted many more in the industry in Kilimanjaro: the number of planted coffee trees increased from 100 to 78,000 in 1922 to 714,000 in 1924 and to 1,266,000 in 1925.[23] The number of small-scale growers in Kilimanjaro increased from 600 to 12,000 in 1929.[24] Emblematically, in 1924 the exports of small-scale growers amounted to 51 percent of the total exports of the territory.[25]

In his further scrutiny Sir Byatt established that it was politically difficult and financially expensive to keep supporting the settlers because it would require increasing land alienation and protection measures. A policy of this kind—that is, of large-scale farming—was simply unlikely since it was not backed up by sufficient capital. Thus, the influx of wealthy settlers was encouraged.[26] At the same time, Byatt's policy decision coupled with another fact: the British Colonial Office (CO) all along believed that the administration of Tanzania would be based on the established West Africa lines, limiting the number of settlers so as to inhibit land alienation.[27] Finally, it was realized that small-scale coffee growers offered a cheaper alternative to produce export crops than the estates.[28]

Table 1. Coffee Trees Owned by KNPA Members in 1930

Location	Growers	Trees	Acres
Kibongoto	198	28,597	27
Masama	1,128	63,2013	587
Machame	1,694	746,402	696
Kindi	111	42,855	39
Kibosho	1,579	2,062,001	1,917
Mbokomu	280	103	21
Kima Vunjo	874	237,610	26
Kilema	1,010	324,745	3019
Marangu	1,066	900,186	836
Mamba	686	182,710	169
Mwika	57	85,269	81
Mengwe	53	10,413	9
Keni	168	32,300	30
Mkuu	260	39,425	35
Mrao	27	5,402	5
Mashati	31	3,912	3
Olele	57	2,440	2
Useri	85	1,058	0.5
Usangi	255	46,246	42
Ugweno	85	12,840	11
Gonja	125	25,286	23
Kirua Rombo	190	2,308	12
Total	**12,025**	**594,902**	**8,064**

Source: KNPA to PC North Province, 11 July 1930, TNA 19126.

Some developments occurred when Donald Cameron was nominated Governor of Tanganyika in 1931. At first, he managed to discourage coffee growing in Arusha and in the Pare Mountains, but he found it impossible to do so in Kilimanjaro. The watershed year was 1932, when the Co-operative Societies Ordinance, No 7 was approved by the CO. Upon approval, the district officials in Moshi with the assistance of the Northern Provincial Commissioner formed the Kilimanjaro Native Cooperative Society (KNCS). The KNCS immediately presented a demand to the colonial authority (the Northern Province Provincial Commissioner in particular) to be granted coffee marketing monopoly as provided under Section 36 of the Ordinance, subsequently compelling all growers in the given locality to sell their produce through cooperative societies. The Colonial Secretary did not approve the request when it was presented to him.[29] To that effect, the settlers in

Kilimanjaro as well were then compelled to sell their produce through African-owned cooperatives. Colonial officials viewed Section 36 as important since it provided coffee marketing arrangements that protected growers from exploitation by middlemen.[30] Still, they had difficulty enforcing it because the settlers were subject to the same obligation as peasants.

Since the enforcement of the Section proved a challenge to the colonial authority, thinking of alternative options became a priority in order to disentangle the settlers from the trap. This was achieved through policies and legislation that provided for the control of Tanganyika and African-grown coffee, dictating where and to whom it should be sold. Basically, such orientation was meant to serve the interest of the settlers. The foundation of colonial agricultural marketing policies in Tanzania was thus laid, and for this reason it becomes very relevant to investigate the significance of the settlers' opposition against the implementation and the enforcement of Section 36 of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance No 7 of 1932, which has been played down in existing literature, as briefly reviewed below.

Rogers' thesis (1972) focuses primarily on the KNPA history and tribal nationalistic politics in Kilimanjaro.[31] Within her focus, Rogers provides a limited historical account of the coffee marketing policies. Moreover, she does not provide or associate coffee marketing policies with the overall territorial agricultural policies. The works by Iliffe offer a well-documented history of the KNCU and its forerunner, the KNPA.[32] However, he does not establish why and how the KNPA was sidelined through the Co-operative Ordinance and the manipulation of its Section 36. Interestingly, Campbell mentions the disputed clauses, but he does not identify specifically what they are.[33] Bakail and Roberts (1989) examine land and labor policies in Tanzania. Bakail's focus is especially on the period from 1919 to 1924, the years when Sir Horace Byatt served as Governor, whereas Roberts presents developments in East Africa with a significant coverage of the same aspects throughout the interwar years. Both Bakail and Roberts have examined the coffee industry in Kilimanjaro, giving some attention to the relationship between the colonial authority, the settlers, and the local Tanganyikans/Africans.[34] Ogutu (1972) traces the history of local coffee industry in Kilimanjaro and the rise of coffee cooperative societies. However, he does not analyze the key policy issues that led to the formation of the KNPA first, then KNCU and its affiliated societies, and thus aspects like the influence of the settler community on the rise of cooperatives and the promulgation of the various coffee marketing policies are missing in his work.

Neal (1981) has focused on agrarian reforms regarding cash crops such as coffee, cotton, tobacco, groundnuts, tea, and sisal in Tanzania during

British colonial rule.[35] He provides a detailed account of the settlers' demand to exclude locals from growing coffee, and also of the attempt to transfer Kilimanjaro to Kenya. Unlike Neal's approach, this paper narrows its focus to an analysis of the Kilimanjaro-based settlers' demand for preferential treatment from the colonial authority. In the attempt to satisfy the request of the settlers, the colonial authority found itself with the difficult commitment to promulgate policies that would favor the interests of both settlers and local coffee growers, and we argue that this had far-reaching effects for the general agricultural marketing policies in the country. Pim's work has presented a general scenario concerning the contribution made by non-settler growers to colonial agricultural production.[36] Pim's emphasis is primarily placed on agricultural policy and the transitions in policy from German to British colonial rule. Like Kieran, however, he neglects the experience of growers in Kagera region, a gap that this paper fills. Coulson analyzes the engagement of cash crops among small-scale growers by the colonial authority to ensure supply and provide for the export of raw materials, using evidence mostly drawn from secondary sources. Ruthenberg discusses agricultural developments during British colonial rule.[37] Wakefield (1936) highlights how locals were induced to grow coffee in their farms, for example through the transfer of skills.[38] Wakefield also examines various production policies in Tanzania, by citing how they were applied among small-scale crop producers. His work offers relevant and useful ideas on such policies. However, his coverage of most policies is too general and lacks specificity, particularly in clarifying where and why they were applied.

As it stands the literature fails to assess the extent to which the opposition of coffee-farming European settlers played a significant part in shaping colonial agricultural policy, not only in Kilimanjaro but also, importantly, in the whole country during the British colonial era. We attempt to resolve this oversight. In the attempt to fill the identified gaps, this paper takes into account evidence from underutilized primary materials that include various Colonial Office policies, memoranda, and circulars on agricultural crop production and marketing, obtained from Tanzania National Archives (TNA) in Dar Es Salaam. The material exploited for this purpose includes the League of Nations Reports; colonial government documentation; the annual reports of KNPA, KNCU, and MNCB; policies, memoranda, orders, agriculture department meeting minutes and circulars on agriculture and legislation, as well as provincial and district reports; the correspondence between colonial officials in Tanzania and the Colonial Office in London; and finally the KNPA newspaper *Uremi*. In so doing, this paper presents extensive research about dynamics and features of the coffee industry in Kilimanjaro.

Development of the Coffee Industry in Kilimanjaro

Missionaries started opening their coffee farms and instructing some of their converts about coffee farming techniques as early as the 1890s. The influx of settlers brought even more opportunities for small growers to learn how to farm the crop. In fact, some individuals were employed on settlers' farms and that contributed to the further improvement of coffee farming skills among local laborers through the training that was provided. Since missionaries and settlers relied chiefly on local laborers, their training became a priority.[39] On their part, local laborers took advantage of the opportunity, especially since they could collect rejected seeds or, in some cases, receive seedlings as presents from their employers.[40] The first plots served as demonstrations for other locals to undertake the same activity: chiefs and influential headmen began planting Arabica coffee as well. With the high prices that were obtainable after the First World War, the increasing affluence of European planters became apparent, thus motivating even more of the population to grow Arabica coffee as a cash crop.[41]

As mentioned earlier, the Germans, who first colonized Tanzania, opted for a coffee farming policy that allowed the coexistence of both a European plantation and a peasant economy.[42] However, the latter was seriously disrupted during the First World War as growers decided to stop attending their trees, largely because the produce could not easily fetch a market. When the British took over the country they immediately provided support to small-scale coffee growers, since it was one of the British's obligations under the League of Nations' mandate, which stressed the promotion of the people's social, political, and economic interests.[43] Sir Charles Cecil Farquharson Dundas, who was the first District Commissioner of Moshi between 1919 and 1924, spearheaded the support and successfully mobilized local Chiefs (*Mangi*) to engage their subjects in cleaning their farms.[44]

In a further development Dundas himself persuaded local peasants to expand their farms and the government was prompted to employ agriculture officers from 1922 in order to provide guidance on coffee farming.[45] Evidently, this was achieved also on account of the individuals' desire for accruing wealth. In 1916, for example, Kilimanjaro counted 14,000 local-owned Arabica coffee trees.[46] The records show that numbers increased steadily to reach 125,000 in 1922 and 375,000 in 1924. The average plantation contained 3,500 trees but there were several peasants who owned 10,000 trees, and even one with 20,000 trees who realized £200 from his crop. The total production over the past four seasons of the African Arabica grown coffee is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. African Coffee Production over the Past Four Seasons

Year/Season	Tons of Parchment Coffee	Value in Pound Sterling
1927–28	375	
1928–29	378	
1929–30	540	
1930–31	826	29,700
1931–32	446	13,375

Source: Extract from Notes on interview granted by the Acting Governor to settlers' representatives on 25 January 1934, TNA 11908/19 Coffee cultivation by Natives.

Table 3. The Outstanding African Coffee Growers in Kilimanjaro by 1932

Name	Location	Number of Coffee Trees
Shangali Ndeserua	Machame	12,082
Jacob Kihawi	Kibosho	11,892
Lerda Tukia	Uru	10,892
Gideon Masuwa	Machame	7,212
Chief Mashingia	Kirua Vunjo	5,625

Source: KNPA newspaper "Uremi" Issue No. 4, August 1932.

Table 4. Number of Coffee Producers, Acreages

Season	Growers Approximate	Average Approximate (Acreages)
1932–33	12,530	5,160
1933–34	16,800	6,700
1934–35	18,550	7,560
1935–36	21,740	9,380
1936–37	24,280	12,450

Source: Legislative Council (LEGCO) Report on the Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union, 1937.

Chief Gideon Masuwa of Machame was reported as exemplary of the new trend. By 1915, he had grown over 4,000 coffee trees in his farm.[47] There was also an outstanding number of growers emerging across the mountain by the early 1930s (see Table 3). But these and the other growers were perceived as a threat by the settlers. The numbers of coffee trees and attending growers kept increasing over time, as shown in Table 4.

Settlers' Concerns

The expansion of the number of peasants growing coffee became a serious concern for the settlers. The settlers' criticism was voiced intensely from 1922 to 1925 when they protested to the Colonial Authority against allowing the WaChagga small-scale growers in the industry.[48] The core of their arguments was that having inexperienced and unknowledgeable Africans into the industry would lead to spread of coffee pests and diseases that were likely to infect their trees as well, hence negatively affecting their investments in the industry.[49] According to the settlers, the poor farm management performed by WaChagga small-scale coffee growers threated them with the loss of reputation of their coffee on the world market.[50] Their complaint included other aspects: for example, the settlers accused the WaChagga of theft of their produce, and they lamented that in certain cases their economic competitors were planting coffee right up to the boundary of settler-owned coffee estates. They considered that this would make thieving almost impossible to check.[51]

To cope with these threats, the settlers asked the government to enforce a demarcated area (neutral zone) between European and non-European coffee estates so as to prevent larceny and spread of diseases. The Europeans were prepared to uproot coffee trees from their plantations, if necessary, on a strip of their land in order to create a neutral boundary.[52] They also suggested that the neutral zone should be enforced under the Plant, Pests, and Diseases Regulations.[53] The Governor reacted by admitting the seriousness of coffee thieving, but considered that a neutral zone would hardly have provided a solution for the prevention of theft.[54] He promised, however, to take up the matter to the Department of Agriculture, but nothing could be done as that would contradict with the colonial authority policy that supported small-scale growers.

Arguably, the colonial authority's inaction was integral to the development of coffee industry among the small-scale growers in Kilimanjaro which fell within Britain's mandate obligations. This again was an attempt to convey a good image to growers as compared to the previous German colonial rule. Importantly, support efforts to small-scale growers were designed to revive the crop for the realization of the self-sufficiency policy. Through such support, the colonial authority offered training to peasant growers that improved their knowledge and skills; hence they became better and more progressive agriculturists on their own land.[55] The encouragement of small-scale growers by Dundas to produce coffee in Kilimanjaro was meant to enable farmers to achieve a reliable source of income, so that they could pay taxes and contribute to revenues, facilitating the administration of the colony.[56] Such initiative by Dundas and other colonial officials led to the tremendous and rapid growth of acreage in production: by 1936 there were nearly 6,000,000 trees owned by small holders and the volume of coffee produced by growers surpassed that of the European planters.[57] This situation implies the emergence of two competing agricultural sectors: the European plantation/settlers on the one hand, and the Wachagga small-scale growers on the other. Clearly, this situation provided the ground for tension between the two. As seen earlier, the settlers sustained the contention that the Africans were "ill-informed as far as the [coffee] industry is concerned."[58]

One could wonder why settlers did not pursue a more conciliatory approach towards the peasant farmers. Or to what extent their claims were grounded in reality or guided by instrumental reasons, namely curtailing those African farmers who were beginning to out-produce them—largely due to the practice of intercropping coffee with bananas, as opposed to the single-crop farming style used by the settlers. In reality, the settlers' main concern was not the alleged fear of diseases per se, but rather the shortage of cheap labor on their farms, since local inhabitants were not available to provide labor as they were also attending their farms, both food and cash crops.[59] It is worthy adding that unlike in Kenya, where inhabitants were confined to reserves and were not allowed to produce crops (hence laborers with deprived livelihood were forced to work on settlers' plantations and in other sectors), this was not so in Tanzania.

In Tanzania, peasants had access to land as provided under the Land Ordinance of 1923. Furthermore, the articles of the mandate protected the colonized from exploitation under slavery as well as from any compulsory labor circumstances. Therefore, the inhabitants of Tanzania could choose to work on settlers' plantations or not. This was again one of the contributing factors that deprived settlers of labor supply.[60] The settlers therefore had to find means that would facilitate displacing the growers from the coffee industry and deprive them of the source of income in order to compel them to become laborers on settlers' plantations. Similarly, laborers were presented with the dilemma of whether to offer their labor on settlers' plantations or to concentrate instead on their farms, from which they could earn a reasonable income for economic autonomy and for paying hut and poll tax.[61] Moreover, some African farmers started hiring a significant number of laborers on their farms, located within the village, thus attracting individuals who until then were supposed to spend hours walking to far-away settlers' estates. Importantly, it should be noted that African growers did not necessarily pay laborers adequately, but they could take advantage of family ties, from which stemmed the obligation to offer their labor. This is yet another feature of the split between European and African farmers unfolding in Tanzania and in Kilimanjaro in particular.

As the split between European and African farmers became more pronounced, Joseph Merinyo, a local inhabitant who was working as a civil servant at the Agriculture Department in Moshi District, came across growers' complaints about threats from settlers. Merinyo discussed the matter with Major Dundas, then the District Commissioner, who then met the farmers to whom they presented the policy that would support them to grow coffee. When Merinyo visited the farmers in Kibosho villages, an interesting idea came out from them: to form an organization to protect the interests of the small-scale coffee growers. This signified a step for the farmers to form an organization in the form of a co-operative association to help in marketing their produce.

In 1922, the Kilimanjaro Native Planters Association (KNPA) was presented to Major Dundas, who approved it.[62] Merinyo was its first African President and Stefano Lema acted as Secretary of the Association.[63] The formation of the KNPA was prompted by two major factors. First was the need to protect African producers from the settler community who strongly opposed their economic activities. Secondly, it met the colonial government demand for production of coffee.[64] Moreover, the colonial government position was that the KNPA was the appropriate institution to enforce the provisions of the Coffee Industry (Registration and Improvement) Ordinance and Plant Pest and Disease Regulations of 1928. The rules enacted by local African authority on the advice of the Agricultural Officer brought local coffee planting under strict control and adherence to stipulated conditions, as planting required a permit from NA and Agriculture Officer.[65]

The task was performed by the KNPA's *wawakilishi*/wakili (representatives) elected directly by growers. The *wawakilishi* kept records showing the details of each plantation, inspected plantations, and reported diseased or dirty coffee plantations to the coffee officer.[66] Interestingly, in 1930, members of the KNPA brought to the attention of the Department of Agriculture cases of unattended European coffee plantations. In the same year, over 50 African smallholders were prosecuted and several others were fined a maximum of eight shillings for failure to attend their coffee trees, for example for negligence in pruning them as provided under the Plant Pest and Disease Control Regulation of 1928.[67]

Apart from agricultural extension services, the KNPA managed to influence the government to grant them a monopoly on the market in the Moshi District (now comprised of Siha, Hai, Rombo, and Moshi districts).[68] Despite all these achievements the KNPA was considered by colonial officials in the Northern Province to be a political problem and was asked the Chief Secretary and Governor to arrest its activities. This became evident especially when the KNPA's leaders opposed some of the colonial policies, such as the farm registration exercise that aimed at arresting increasing landless "natives" and in addition established new land taxes for those who owned more farms.[69] As the friction became unbearable, the Chief Secretary (CS) and Governor had to take the necessary measures to quell the situation. At this stage, a chance to disband the KNPA opened.[70] However, the CS could not pursue his commitment because the League of Nations could have also raised eyebrows at such a move.

The promulgation of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance (1932) became the only avenue out of the impasse. It was followed by the registration of cooperatives from January 1933, under which the KNCU became an umbrella organization with a number of primary societies affiliated to it, established across villages in Moshi district. In this regard, the KNPA was no longer recognized as cooperative organization. This change marked a significant step in strangling the KNPA, considering that under Section 36 of the legislation all growers in the district were required to sell their produce through a cooperative society.

Strickland, the British expert, then in charge of the cooperative organization in Punjab, India, defended the compulsion section burden imposed upon all coffee growers. He stressed that such a clause was universal and cited other cases that had similar provisions, such as the British Agricultural Act that came into effect amid the collapse of the Hopgrowers Limited in Britain, or the legislation then existing in Russia.[71] Finally, Strickland provided other cases that had a similar clause, such as some states in Australia and in South Africa where 10 to 25 percent of growers of a specific crop were compelled to sell it through cooperatives.[72] In fact, the Section led to the compulsory combination of European and African societies, and for them this was not acceptable; it was distasteful to the European settler community.[73] The settler community's concerns were forwarded to the CS with a proposal to amend the clause in their favor or repeal it altogether.[74]

Seimu has noted that the compulsion clause in South Africa's Co-operative Ordinance was designed to control adulteration.[75] Colonial officials like A. L. Pennington, *the Assistant District Officer, also defended* the section, as he reiterated that it "would guarantee business and revenue to a society."[76] However, the Section caused concern for some colonial officials who saw that "its effects may be obtained by forcing non-members to sell through the society."[77] Section 36 presented negative implications for settlers in their freedom to export coffee to foreign markets of their choice. According to the legal provision the settlers, regardless of being or not being members of cooperatives, were required just as African growers to sell their produce to the KNCU and its affiliated societies. In addition to that, settlers believed that Section 36 of the Co-operative Ordinance posed a risk to their business.

The colonial authority, however, realized too late that the clause would have had detrimental effects for the settlers' industry, after the submission of the KNCU's letter asking the colonial authority to enforce Section 36.[78] The colonial officials thus had to evaluate possible options to serve the settlers' coffee industry, and held several consultations to resolve the "controversy." In one of these, Strickland argued that "it was unreasonable to expect these different types of coffee to be bulked and marketed through the same agency."[79] Moreover, in his speech to the East African countries' governors, Strickland also pointed out that "the Ordinance for Europeans should exclusively be for them as one for the natives does not suit them and it is necessary to have the same there should be clauses that separates the two."[80] Seimu has indicated that Strickland's suggestions meant that not only *who* produces, but also *what* is produced should be separated based on race.[81] This was unfolding as the direction and orientation of the agricultural marketing policies in Tanzania. Therefore, it became clear that Section 36 could be manipulated in favor of the settlers, if all joined the Tanganyika Planters Association (TPA), which included members from the European coffee farmers' community in the country who once pointed out that it "would inhibit the inception of proposed society." The Governor exempted the Tanganyika (East Africa) Coffee Growers Co-operative Society Ltd from the provision of the Ordinance mandating it sell its product through KNCU. A letter pointed out that:

> in pursuance of section 36 of the Co-operative Societies Ordinance, 1932, his excellency has pleased to exempt the Tanganyika (East Africa) Coffee Growers Co-operative Ltd from the provisions of Section 36 of the said Ordinance. Following publication of the order of the registrar of cooperative societies informed the Tanganyika of the approval for registration of the co-operative society as well as an exemption as provided under section 36 of the legislation.[82]

Clearly, amendments to the clause were unlikely because an approval from the CO would have taken too long. Consequently, the colonial authority came up with the Chagga Rule policy, which excluded the settlers from obligations to sell their produce, separating de facto Africans and Europeans. The new rule came into effect on 1 October 1934 and applied to all Chagga coffee producers in Moshi district. Coulson documented the Chagga Rule but described it simply as a compulsory marketing order.[83] Coulson has not linked it with any other agricultural marketing policies and legislation in the country. Rajagopalan distorts its background as he describes the Chagga Rule as part of Section 36 of the cooperative legislation.[84]

Table 5. Societies Affiliated to the Tanganyika Coffee Growers' Association (TCGA)

Name of the Association	Location
Kilimanjaro Coffee Growers Association	Kilimanjaro
Mbeya Mountain Coffee Planters Association	Mbeya
Mbozi Planters Association	Mbeya
Oldean Planters Association	Arusha
Meru Coffee Growers Association	Arusha
Usa River Planters Association	Arusha
Ufiome Planters Association	Mbeya
Usambara Planters Association	Lushoto

Source: The Tanganyika Coffee Growers' Association.

The colonial authority involved the Chagga Native Council to draft the by-law that provided for compulsory African coffee marketing, popularly referred to as the Chagga Rule or *masharti* in Kiswahili, to be made under Section 15 of the Native Authority (NA) Ordinance.[85] According to the colonial authority, the Chagga Rule was a temporary measure pending as the amendment of Section 36 of the Co-operative Ordinance had proved to be a challenge to resolve. Under the Chagga Rule, African growers were required to sell their produce through the KNCU and its affiliated societies and it sought to secure the loyalty of members of cooperatives through force.[86] Whereas the African growers were compelled to market their coffee through cooperative societies, European planters were not. In a move to keep the settlers away from locals, a safety valve for them was the Tanganyika Coffee Growers' Association (TCGA)—the European-only cooperative society registered in 1935—so that their coffee produce could be sold through a non-African-only society. The TCGA had several branches in coffee producing locations in the country, as shown in Table 5.

Under the Chagga Rule the KNCU was empowered and was the only institution licensed to purchase and sell African-grown coffee, compelling producers to sell their coffee to cooperatives. The Chagga Rule policy prompted the amendment of some 30 to 32 sections of the KNCU and affiliated societies' by-laws in 1934. The amendments clarified that:

a. Under Section 30 that, every member of the society shall deliver to the society, or if so directed by the committee, to the KNCU all coffee grown by him to be marketed by the KNCU;

b. Under Section 31 that, the society shall make such arrangements as maybe decided by the KNCU for delivery of coffee and the distribution of money received as proceeds there from; and
c. Under Section 32 that, should any member, without the authority of the KNCU deliver, sell or otherwise dispose of coffee to any firm, persons or body of persons other than the KNCU he shall pay to the society on behalf of the KNCU by way of liquated damages a sum equal to double the value of such coffee at current local prices, or such less sum as the KNCU may willing to accept.

Some growers were not satisfied and instituted a lawsuit to challenge the compulsion measure on grounds that it was repugnant to the general laws of the Territory and was unreasonable in relation to the welfare of growers. Again, it was viewed by the colonial authority that the legislation had drawn the NA into coffee industry economics. However, the KNCU experienced business difficulties just two years after its inauguration.[87] The trouble originated from the lower prices paid to growers compared to non-members, especially settlers. In certain occasions it even failed to pay them.[88]

Whereas the growers felt underpaid, several traders and missionaries—mostly Asian, German, and British—paid better prices than the Union. This was especially the case during the 1933–34 to 1936–37 seasons. The Indian company led by Sheriff Jiwa paid 20 cents, and H. Bueb paid 21 to 25 cents, depending on the quality of the coffee delivered throughout 1933–34 to 1936–37.[89] German settlers offered between 10 and 15 percent above the market price, on condition that part of the payment was spent to purchase agricultural implements that they were selling.[90] Since growers witnessed better payment being given to others, they felt cheated by cooperative societies. Consequently, many tried to take themselves out of affiliated societies. This was, however, impossible under Section 36, infuriating and frustrating growers further. The literature and reports show that some of the growers resorted to violence and riots. In some instances they vandalized and burned to ashes the cooperatives' coffee warehouses. Coulson attempted in his work to explain these riots, but his narration lacks a proper exploration of the measures that were taken by the colonial authority.[91] The evidence shows that the government responded by force, drafting in the police and air force to restore law and order.[92] In the operation, around 70 rioters were apprehended and given jail terms.[93] Fourteen others were deported within the country, mainly to Singida, Iringa, and Sumbawanga in the southern highlands of Tanzania.[94]

Confronted with the need to restore trust and confidence among coffee growers, the colonial authority had to come up with a new solution, which

Table 6. Coffee Production and Amount Paid to the KNCU (1932–46)

Season	Coffee Crop Parchment (in Tons)	Amount Paid in £ to Growers	Price per lb. Paid to Growers
1932–33	1,072	35,426	29.55
1933–34	1,167	35,384	27.03
1934–35	1,587	35,456	19.85
1935–36	1,684	33,995	16.94
1936–37	882	18,707	18.95
1937–38	1,472	33,336	20.16
1938–39	1,959	58,747	26.78
1939–40	2,680	72,275	24.17
1940–41	4,063	84,798	18.53
1941–42	1,948	52,184	23.97
1942–43	3,103	145,399	41.96
1943–44	2,114	131,012	57.49
1944–45	3,974	276,380	62.96
1945–46	3.102	173,032	49.81
Total	**30,807**	**1,186,131**	

Source: Moshi District Book I 1939–40 to 1943–44 seasons and the KNCU 1946–47 Annual Report. Appendix B.

was represented by the passage of the Native Coffee Control Ordinance No. 26 of 1937. The introduction of the new law was tantamount to an admission of failure of the previous Chagga Rule. Although the latter was conceived as a temporary measure, it was an embarrassment to the colonial officials.[95] The Provincial Commissioner pointed out that the Chagga Rule exposed the colonial government "into a mess"[96] and the Provincial Commissioner revealed that "Chiefs disliked the Chagga Rule."[97]

Despite facing an embarrassment, the colonial government was not prepared to lose control of the small-scale grown coffee, as it promulgated new coffee legislation based on Section 36 of the 1932 Co-operative Ordinance, which was the Native Coffee Control Ordinance No. 26 of 1937. Consequently, the Chagga Rule had to be revoked by the Governor on 21 December 1937 in response to the recommendation made by a committee that investigated the crisis or the coffee riots.[98] The Native Coffee Control Ordinance No. 26 was therefore considered a solution that not only replaced the Chagga Rule, but was also specifically passed to control coffee grown by Africans. In drafting the new legislation, the exclusion of European planters remained a priority. In their work, Kimario,[99] Gorst,[100] Leubuscher,[101] and

Strickland[102] discuss this compulsion marketing arrangement and legislation. However, the analyses they provide does not trace the background of the passage of the 1937 Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) legislation.

On this point, this paper has established that the colonial government acted in consideration of the notion that African growers could not properly manage the industry on their own. This was a myth, and an instrumental evaluation aimed at ensuring the control of coffee produced by small-scale growers. Under the Coffee (Control and Marketing) Ordinance No. 26 of 1937, the non-settler coffee industry was brought under more direct government control. Clearly, the colonial government had a rationale for the legislation, which was presented to the Provincial Commissioners;[103] it did likewise to the Legislative Council as well as to the Colonial Office. First, the legislation provided a legal ground for cooperatives in Kilimanjaro to carry out coffee marketing functions and empower them to deal with crop husbandry as well as control of plant diseases.

Against this backdrop, the colonial authority envisioned that cooperatives would operate without intervention of the local chiefs as provided under Section 15 of the Native Authority Ordinance of 1925 as was the case with the KNPA. In practice, the ordinance empowered the Governor to appoint an agency to facilitate purchasing of coffee from growers. This legislation led to the creation in November 1937 of the government's "native" coffee control board, named Moshi Native Coffee Board (MNCB). The Fabian colonial Bureau, a largely autonomous think tank on British colonial and imperial policy, was critical in respect to the legislation and the creation of these boards, and termed its development "chequered."[104]

Both the MNCB and Bukoba Native Coffee Board (BNCB) objectives were to advance and improve the cultivation of coffee grown by local peasants. There were several other similar boards, such as the Songea Native Tobacco Board, the Nyamirembe Native Tobacco Board, and the Central Province Creameries Board. Among other things, these boards were responsible for providing farming instructions to growers, in relation to the methods of planting, cultivation, and harvesting, or to the preparation and marketing of coffee.[105] These boards were granted exclusive powers to appoint a local agent to handle crops. This culminated in the colonial authority's control over the marketing crops produced by small-scale growers, as it became compulsory to have their crops marketed through an agent appointed by the board and determined the price of the produce as provided under the Native Coffee (Control and Marketing) Ordinance No. 26 of 1937. Cooperatives and private traders appointed by these Boards to handle the crop in the country were indirectly integrated into the colonial authority marketing policy. These Boards were instruments in the hands of the colonial state to procure and market the cash crops produced by African growers for export to the metropole. In the course of executing their functions, these Boards also facilitated the collection of revenues generated from export. Ironically, colonial authorities argued that the "functions of the boards were complementary to the work of the co-operatives/movement."[106] In fact, small-scale growers conducted crop production while marketing and profit-making was the responsibility of the Boards.

Moreover, the crop marketing legislation and policies created and reinforced the vertical relationship between cooperatives. At the time, the co-operatives became an extended body of the government as the latter managed to control and handle crop marketing through the Boards. In this regard, the cooperative movement never attained autonomous status, as it became part of the government machinery in extracting resources and exploiting small-scale growers. For example, the MNCB was required to supply 4,000 tons of coffee annually to Britain between 1940 and 1952.[107] In Kagera region the BNCB collected 4,000 tons of coffee annually from marketing zones and supplied it to the Ministry of Food from 1941 to 1954.[108] Similarly, the settlers/European-only cooperative society, TCGA,[109] was also granted monopoly over the marketing of peasant-produced coffee in Tanga, Arusha as well as Mbeya regions.[110]

The 1937 "native" coffee control and marketing legislation was amended in 1949, when the African Agricultural (Control and Marketing) No. 57, Ordinance 1949 was put in place. The 1949 ordinance was most comprehensive as it dealt with all African-produced cash crops, for which cooperative societies had to play a key role in handling and marketing. Unlike the previous 1937 "native" coffee control and marketing legislation, the 1949 ordinance recognized the existence of cooperatives and compelled the Marketing Boards to promote cooperatives. These powers granted to the board became the norm in Tanzanian agricultural marketing policies until 1990s, when trade liberalization was adopted.

Conclusion

Missionaries and government officials were key players in the promotion of coffee cultivation among the African and Tanganyikan small holders in Kilimanjaro and beyond, during German colonial rule and also when the British took over Tanzania. In the post-war years, Britain intensified agricultural commodity production in the country in order to ensure an adequate supply of coffee. The colonial marketing authority effectively employed the 1932 Co-operatives Ordinance, (Section 36), known as the "Chagga Rule", which forced small-scale growers to sell their produce through cooperatives.

However, Section 36 was put in place not for economic purpose but as a political maneuver through which the cooperatives were granted monopoly over coffee. This not only dictated what small growers should produce for export, but also worked as a control measure over crop marketing. Additionally, the legislation went hand in hand with ensuring that surpluses were accrued by the Boards. The mentioned section of the cooperative legislation provided the bedrock to the cash crop marketing policy in Tanzania over four decades. In this way, by controlling agricultural products and their marketing, the agriculture sector came to play a part in the recovery of the post-war British economy, especially in the 1950s. This was part of the perpetuation and possibly the extension of colonial extractive policies: the cash crop marketing policies formulated during the colonial period remained unchanged at independence when they were still utilized to facilitate marketing of crops through a government-appointed agency until neoliberal reforms in the early 1990s.

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